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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD: A
SUGGESTED ROADMAP TO THE NEW
STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS
Recent years have seen a dramatic internationalization of the
securities markets as investors seek greater portfolio diversification
and businesses search for new financing sources across national bor-
ders.' Many courts have used a traditional jurisdictional analysis to
define the scope of American regulatory authority over international
securities transactions, relying on formal links between the transac-
tion in question and American territory.2 To better reflect the in-
creased irrelevance of national borders to participants in the
international securities market and to restrain American courts'
overly aggressive assertions ofjurisdiction, the American Law Insti-
tute would require that jurisdiction be "reasonable. ' 3 In a draft re-
vision of its Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, the ALI recommends that courts determine reasonableness
through an assessment of competing national interests.
A more rational allocation of regulatory authority is necessary
to remedy the increasing friction between nations with valid claims
to regulatory power in individual cases. 4 The law must attempt to
provide increased certainty for participants in the international mar-
I From 1978 to 1982, foreign purchases of stocks in the United States increased
from $20.1 billion to $41.8 billion. Foreign sales of stocks and transactions in bonds in
the United States showed a similar increase. In the first six months after the SEC insti-
tuted a new short form registration statement, 11 foreign companies registered approxi-
mately $1.2 billion in offerings. Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver By Conduct-A
Possible Response To the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 6 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP.
MARKET L. 1, 2 (1984). See also Wayne, Wall Street's Risky London Bet, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4,
1984, at Fl, col. I (describing likelihood of large increase in activity by American firms
on London Stock Exchange upon restructuring of that exchange); Chira, Changes At To-
kyo's Big Board, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1984, at Dl, col. 3 (reporting that for first time
foreign securities firms can obtain seats on Tokyo Stock Exchange).
2 See infra notes 19-54 and accompanying text.
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) §§ 403, 416 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as DRAFv RESTATEMENT].
The Draft Restatement purports to restate "international law that is part of our law, and
other U.S. law that relates to foreign relations." The Draft Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States (Revised), 76 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 184, 187 (1982) (com-
ment of Louis Henkin) [hereinafter cited as Draft Restatement (Revised)]. See AVC
Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying
Draft Restatement).
4 See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text; see also Widmer, The U.S. Securities
Laws: Banking Law of the World? (A Reply to Messrs. Loomis and Grant), 1J. COMP. CORP. L.
& SEC. REG. 39 (1978).
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kets and should better conform to market realities. The Draft Re-
statement's balancing approach, however, may strain the competence
of the courts5 and inject an additional element of uncertainty into
international securities transactions. 6
This Note surveys courts' analyses of the extraterritorial scope
of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347
under traditional doctrines, and examines the Draft Restatement's in-
corporation of these doctrines. The Note then analyzes the new fac-
tors that the Draft Restatement considers relevant to the
reasonableness of jurisdiction and suggests an interpretation that
should overburden neither the courts nor the parties planning a
transaction. This suggested approach retains much of the Supreme
Court's pre-Draft Restatement analysis but adds an element of aware-
ness of conflicts among different regulatory systems. In addition, it
draws on the conflict of laws "internal affairs rule" to suggest a ju-
risdictional per se rule in certain cases. 8
I
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER SECURITIES FRAUD
UNDER THE TRADITIONAL CONDUCT AND
EFFECTS TESTS
American courts have long recognized that international law re-
strains their power to regulate international activities. 9 These limits
reflect the notion that a state's jurisdiction depends on a nexus be-
tween the activity and the state's territory. International law princi-
ples allow a state to assert jurisdiction over conduct occurring
within its territory under the subjective territorial principle or "con-
duct test."' 0 Similarly, jurisdiction exists under the objective terri-
torial principle or "effects test" for extraterritorial conduct that has
5 See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
6 See ALI Foreign Law Project Would Create Uncertainty In Law, SEC's Goeher Says, 16
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 44, 1748 (Nov. 9, 1984).
See also Nagan, Conflicts Theory In Conflict. A Systematic Appraisal of Traditional and Con-
temporary Theories, 3J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 359 (1982) (conflict of laws field, from which
Draft Restatement derives its balancing approach, is "replete with incomplete and ambigu-
ous rules."); Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International
Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 366 (1979)
(discussing use of conflicts of laws principles in international law); see also DRAFT RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 3, at viii ("Foreword" by Herbert Wechsler, noting similarity be-
tween requirement of reasonableness and § 6 of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
8 See infra notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
9 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[Ain act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possi-
ble construction remains ....").
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965).
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domestic repercussions."I International law allows nations great dis-
cretion in determining the degree of territorial implication required
before that nation may exercise jurisdiction to regulate an activity. 12
Federal court jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud is
based upon federal question jurisdiction.'1 If the federal securities
laws do not apply to the transnational activity at issue, then no fed-
eral question exists, and the court has no jurisdiction to hear cases
arising out of the activity. Thus, courts limit the extraterritorial
reach of their jurisdiction by referring to the legislative intent to ap-
ply federal securities laws to transnational activity. 14 Congress was
silent regarding the extraterritorial application of much of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934,15 including its general antifraud pro-
vision, section 10(b). 16 The Securities Exchange Commission was
similarly silent regarding rule lOb-5, the general antifraud rule
promulgated under section 10(b). 17 However, courts have imputed
to Congress an intent not to regulate securities transactions absent a
level of domestic conduct or effects that exceeds traditional interna-
tional law standards.18
A. The Second Circuit's Approach to Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is the source for
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965) provides that
[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if...
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles ofjustice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.
See also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir.), modified on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395
U.S. 906 (1969); infra notes 19-21, 24-28 and accompanying text.
12 Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.LJ., ser. A, No. 10 (Judgment of
Sept. 7).
13 Although foreign parties could conceivably bring suit in federal court for foreign
securities fraud under diversity jurisdiction, no such cases apparently exist.
14 DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 403 reporters' note 2.
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
16 Id. § 78j(b).
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
18 According to the original Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 17(a), any
conduct within a nation's territory may serve as a basis for jurisdiction. See Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985, 992-93 (2d Cir.) (no jurisdiction on basis of
preparatory acts unless domestic effects are consequence of those acts), cert. denied sub
nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
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much judicial analysis of the extraterritorial scope of rule lOb-5.
The Second Circuit first addressed the issue in Schoenbaum v. First-
brook, 19 in which the court found jurisdiction on the basis of the con-
duct's domestic effects. Schoenbaum was a derivative suit brought by
American shareholders of a Canadian corporation. The corporation
conducted all of its operations in Canada but was listed on the
American Stock Exchange. The court found that a sale of treasury
shares to the corporation's controlling shareholders, for what the
plaintiffs claimed was inadequate consideration,20 would diminish
the value of the corporation's shares traded on the American Stock
Exchange. Consequently, the court held that jurisdiction exists "at
least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a
national securities exchange and are detrimental to the interests of
American investors." 2' The court later held that "effects" jurisdic-
tion can also exist where the shares involved are not traded on an
American exchange but are held by American investors. 22
The Second Circuit further developed the "conduct" and "ef-
fects" tests in several cases arising from the collapse of the IOS off-
shore investment fund complex.23 In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 24
a class of American and foreign investors sued American underwrit-
ers and accountants that were involved in a European offering of
mutual fund shares. The Bersch court developed the relationship be-
tween the conduct and effects tests in several ways. First, the court
held that absent fraudulent conduct, United States jurisdiction ex-
ists only over transactions that directly injure specific "purchasers or
sellers. . . in whom the United States has an interest" and not over
those transactions that "simply have an adverse effect on the Ameri-
can economy or American investors generally."-25 Such direct injury
19 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
20 Id. at 205.
21 Id. at 208.
22 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-39 (2d
Cir. 1972).
23 IOS was a collection of offshore funds. An offshore fund is organized under laws
other than those of the United States to sell shares to foreign investors and invest and
deal in American securities and real estate. Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Extraterritorial
Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 1225, 1251
(1972). For an account of the IOS collapse, see C. RAw, B. PAGE & G. HODGSON, Do
You SINCERELY WANT TO BE RICH? (1971).
24 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423
U.S. 1018 (1975).
25 Id. at 989 (footnote omitted). Plaintiffs' allegations of effects that the Bersch court
considered too "general" to support jurisdiction included deterioration of foreign in-
vestor confidence in American securities markets, large redemptions by IOS sharehold-
ers requiring liquidation of American securities, and a breakdown in the offshore
investment industry, which had played a substantial role as a conduit of foreign capital
into American markets. Id. at 987-88.
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exists when plaintiffs who reside in the United States incur losses, so
rule lOb-5 applies to transactions involving such plaintiffs "whether
or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance oc-
curred in this country." 26 The Second Circuit further held that ju-
risdiction over sales in Europe to foreign citizens, with no specific
domestic injury, exists only if substantial domestic conduct "directly
caused" their losses.2 7 However, the court also held that merely
"preparatory" domestic conduct would support jurisdiction over
sales to American citizens who resided abroad.28
The Second Circuit developed the distinction between "sub-
stantial" and "preparatory" conduct in Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Inter-
nationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A. 29 The Fidenas
plaintiffs, a German dealer in commercial paper and the family-
owned Bahamian and Swiss companies that he managed, charged
French and Swiss computer sales companies with issuing fraudulent
notes. The plaintiffs had arranged two financings for the defendants
through the issuance of promissory notes, which were sold to the
plaintiffs' customers. 30 The notes were fraudulent, and a Swiss
court convicted the Swiss defendant's chief financial officer of crimi-
nal fraud.3 ' The plaintiffs claimed that rule lOb-5 applied to the
sale of the notes because the American parent of one of the defend-
ant corporations knew of an attempt to "cover up" the fraud. The
court found that this "conduct" was at most "secondary or tertiary"
and would not support jurisdiction when all of the parties to the
action were foreigners residing abroad.3 2 Although some of the
notes were sold to nonparty Americans, the court found that effects
26 Id. at 993. The Eighth Circuit, in Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515
(8th Cir. 1973), and the Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1973), also have relied solely on the effects doctrine when domestic conduct
would not support jurisdiction.
27 519 F.2d at 991-93. Consequently, the circuit court instructed the district court
to determine on remand whether the defendant underwriter's domestic conduct was
substantial and essential to the European offering. Id. at 991-92, 1001.
28 Id. at 987. See infra notes 94-101 for an explanation of the grounds of this dis-
tinction. The Bersch court held that preparatory conduct had to be of "material impor-
tance" and "significantly contribute" to the fraud. Id. at 993.
29 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979).
30 Id. at 7.
31 Id. at 8.
32 Id. Following dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs
brought suit directly against the American parent of the Swiss corporation that had is-
sued the fraudulent notes. Fidenas AG v. Honeywell Inc., 501 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). The district court dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction because
neither the conduct nor the effects test "turn[s] on the nature of the defendant," but
rather on the predominantly American or foreign nature of the transaction. Id. at 1040-
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on nonparties were of no jurisdictional significance.33
In 11T v. Cornfeld 34 the Second Circuit again required that, ab-
sent domestic effects, fraudulent conduct must have a predomi-
nantly American situs. The action in Cornfeld related to a "series of
acquisitions by IIT," an investment fund "of securities related to a
complex of companies controlled by oneJohn M. King, an American
oil and gas entrepreneur. ' 35 The securities involved in Cornfeld in-
cluded common stock of an American corporation, KRC, and
eurodollar convertible debentures of a Netherlands Antilles corpo-
ration, KRCC, a wholly owned subsidiary of KRC that owned no
operating assets.36 KRCC's debentures were guaranteed by KRC,
convertible into KRC common stock, and were issued simultane-
ously with a domestic issue of KRC debentures. 37 Allegedly, the
managers of two corporations that were part of the IOS complex
had received personal kickbacks for inducing IIT to invest in KRC. 38
Plaintiff IIT claimed that this constituted a violation of rule lOb-5. 39
The Second Circuit found that subject matter jurisdiction existed as
to plaintiff's purchase of the KRCC eurodollar convertible
debentures .40
The Second Circuit expressly recognized that the
"[d]etermination whether American activities 'directly' caused
losses to foreigners depends not only on how much was done in the
United States but also on how much (here how little) was done
abroad."' 4 ' Thus, the court interpreted the "directness" require-
ment of Bersch42 to require a balancing of domestic and foreign con-
duct. Although the domestic conduct in Cornfeld appeared similar to
that which the court found "merely preparatory" 43 in Bersch, the
court distinguished Bersch on the basis of several factors. First, the
domestic citizenship of the Cornfeld issuer and defendants gave the
United States a greater interest in regulating the issuance.44 Sec-
ond, in Bersch, the bulk of the preparation of the prospectus and
33 606 F.2d at 8. The Court, however, noted that in an SEC enforcement proceed-
ing, such effects would be relevant. Id.
34 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
35 Id. at 914.
36 Id. at 914, 919.
37 Id. at 919-20.
38 Id. at 915.
39 Id. at 914. Defendants in the suit were the American accounting firm and under-
writers involved in the transaction, as aiders and abettors, and lIT's securities broker, as
both a principal and an aider and abettor. Id. at 915.
40 Id. at 919-21.
41 Id. at 920-21.
42 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
43 Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 920.
44 Id. at 920.
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financial statements "had to be done abroad," 45 where the foreign
issuing company maintained its records. In Cornfeld, however, these
activities necessarily occurred in the United States. Thus, the court
recognized that not only was the proportional quantity of domestic
conduct relevant, but the necessity of the domestic situs also af-
fected the jurisdictional inquiry.
B. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Other Circuits
Instead of developing a conduct test that balances the domestic
and foreign aspects of a transaction, other circuits using the "con-
duct" test have concentrated solely on whether the conduct alleged
to have occurred within the United States was "preparatory" or
"significant," without comparing domestic and foreign aspects of a
transaction. In Continental Grain (Australia) Ply. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds,
Inc.,46 the Eighth Circuit found that the partial negotiation and ulti-
mate signing of a contract in the United States satisfied the conduct
test.47 The court framed the test as an analysis of the "relationship
between defendants' conduct . . . and the alleged fraudulent
scheme, specifically whether defendants' conduct in the United
States was significant. . . . The conduct in the United States cannot
be 'merely preparatory.' "48
In SEC v. Kasser,4 9 the Third Circuit found jurisdiction based on
domestic conduct similar to that in Continental Grain. The transac-
tion in Kasser had no domestic effects because the sole victim of the
allegedly fraudulent conduct was a corporation entirely owned by
the Canadian Province of Manitoba. 50 However, the court held that
the negotiation and execution of a contract in New York directly
caused the fraud, providing a sufficient basis forjurisdiction.5 1 The
court implied that even less domestic conduct would.support juris-
diction, stating that jurisdiction exists "in transnational securities
cases where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent
scheme occurs within this country. '52 The Third Circuit justified its
finding by explaining that it was "reluctant to conclude that Con-
gress intended to allow the United States to become a 'Barbary
Coast,' as it were, harboring international securities 'pirates.' 3
45 Id.
46 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
47 Id. at 412-15. The closing and delivery of stock took place in Australia. Id. at
412-13.
48 Id. at 420.
49 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. deniedsub uora. Churchill Forest Indus. Ltd. v. SEC,
431 U.S. 938 (1977).
50 Id. at 111-12.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 114.
53 Id. at 116.
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The Ninth Circuit relied on this rationale to find jurisdiction on sim-
ilar facts in Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz.54
These cases demonstrate that other circuits have not followed
the Second Circuit's balancing of the quantity and quality of domes-
tic and foreign conduct. They rely instead on the distinction be-
tween significant and preparatory acts. This distinction allows them
to find subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of nearly any act
within the United States that furthers a fraud. That the American
location is coincidental or merely a matter of convenience is irrele-
vant to their inquiry. This expansive approach results in a greater
likelihood of concurrent jurisdictional claims by other nations. The
formalism of the approach ignores the irrelevance of national bor-
ders to participants in international markets and results in applica-
tions of American securities laws to transactions more appropriately
governed by other regulatory systems.
II
JURISDICTION OVER EXTRATERRITORIAL SECURITIES FRAUD
UNDER THE DRAFT RESTATEMENT
Courts have given great deference to the jurisdictional provi-
sions of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States.55 The Restatement provided authority for courts' appli-
cation of both the conduct and effects tests to jurisdictional disputes
in rule lOb-5 cases. 56 The American Law Institute (ALl) recently
reexamined the question of extraterritorial applicability of American
regulation, or "jurisdiction to prescribe,"' 57 in a proposed revision
to the Restatement. In a tentative draft promulgated in 1981, the ALl
reporters suggested that extraterritorial jurisdiction should be sub-
ject to a rule of "reasonableness. ' 58
Section 416 of the Draft Restatement 59 establishes threshold
54 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983).
55 Draft Restatement (Revised), supra note 3, at 195 (comment ofJohn Huock).
56 See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d
Cir. 1972); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
415 (8th Cir 1979).
57 DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402.
58 Id. § 403(2) & comment a.
59 Section 416 provides that:
(1) Any transaction in securities carried out, or intended to be car-
ried out, on a securities market in the United States is subject to United
States jurisdiction to prescribe, regardless of the nationality or place of
business of the participants in the transaction or of the issuer of the
securities.
(2) As regards transactions in securities not on a securities market in
the United States, but where
(a) securities of the same issuer are traded on a securities mar-
ket in the United States; or
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levels of domestic conduct or effects that a court may require before
applying American securities regulations to an international trans-
action. 60  The section includes four jurisdictional tests:
(a) consummation of a transaction in a United States securities mar-
ket,6 ' (b) trading in the issuer's securities on American markets, 6 2
(c) representations or negotiations in the United States,63 and
(d) United States citizenship or residency of the defendant or "per-
son sought to be protected." 64 Two of the section 416jurisdictional
tests ("a" and "c" above) incorporate the conduct test into the Draft
Restatement's analysis; the other two ("b" and "d" above) incorpo-
rate the effects test. Therefore, none of the provisions depart, in
themselves, from established law. However, section 416 differenti-
ates between the jurisdictional tests on the basis of reasonableness.
(b) representations are made or negotiations are conducted in
the United States in regard to the transactions; or
(c) the party subject to the regulation is a United States national
or resident, or the persons sought to be protected are residents of
the United States,
the authority of the United States to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe
depends on its reasonableness in light of evaluation under Section
403(2).
Id. § 416.
60 Id. § 416(1) comment c & reporters' note 5 (jurisdictional tests provided by
§ 416 are useful illustrations but are not conclusive).
61 Id. According to reporters' note 1, this provision finds precedential support in
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906
(1969).
62 DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 416(2)(b). See Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1337 (2d Cir. 1972).
63 DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 416(2)(a). See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz,
712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oil-
seeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 415 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 104, 115 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. Ltd. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
64 DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 416(2)(c). See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975); supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Under the "nationality principle" of international law, jurisdiction is valid when the
defendant is American. However, the Draft Restatement notes that in the securities context
jurisdiction might not be reasonable if the security was not registered in the United
States and the relevant conduct occurred abroad. DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 3,
§ 416 reporters' note 3. This reporters' note conforms § 416(2)(c) to established law.
The nationality principle is an "exceptional" jurisdictional basis, while jurisdiction
based on domestic conduct or effects is the "normal" basis. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra
note 3, § 402 comment b; see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 935 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (territoriality, not nationality, is customary and preferred basis ofjurisdiction). If
American jurisdiction is premised on nationality and another nation could reasonably
claim jurisdiction under territorial principles, American courts should, absent compel-
ling circumstances, decline to apply American law. However, if no other nation can
legally claim jurisdiction, courts might apply the nationality principle to prevent the
existence of unregulated activity.
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The first jurisdictional test is "per se" reasonable, 65 but the other
three are subject to further inquiry under section 403(2) regarding
the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction.66 In requiring an eval-
uation of reasonableness, the Draft Restatement departs from the es-
tablished law.
Under the new reasonableness requirement courts are expected
to "analyze various interests, examine contacts and links, give effect
to justified expectations, search for the 'center of gravity' of a given
situation, and develop priorities" to determine whether jurisdiction
can be maintained. 67 In the words of one antitrust court, "[t]he
65 DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 416(1). The reporters' note 2 to § 416,
however, indicates that § 416(1) was drafted in light of the principles of § 403.
66 Section 416(2) requires the reasonableness approach of § 403(2) to be applied to
subsections (a), (b), and (c) of § 416(2). See supra note 59. Section 403(2) provides that:
Whether the exercise ofjurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluat-
ing all the relevant factors, including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulat-
ing state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in
the regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regu-
late such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regu-
lation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the tradi-
tions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulat-
ing the activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
DRA-r RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 403(2).
67 DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, part IV, ch. 1, introductory note at 93. The
Draft Restatement represents a significant departure from the prior Restatement, which con-
templated that balancing interests would not be ajurisdictional prerequisite, but merely
an "act of good faith in moderating enforcement ofjurisdiction authorized by law." Id.
§ 403 reporters' note 10. The Draft Restatement claims that the reasonableness require-
ment is a "principle of international law." Id. § 403 comment a. Several implications
necessarily follow if reasonableness is a rule of international, rather than domestic, law.
For instance, the judgments of courts that lack jurisdiction will not be recognized by
other jurisdictions. Thus, judgments can be attacked collaterally on grounds of unrea-
sonableness. Also, if American courts render judgments without jurisdiction, other na-
tions may deny enforcement assistance and promulgate retaliatory legislation. If
jurisdiction exists under international law in a specific case, such acts are not justified.
58 ALI PROc. 263-64 (1981).
The Draft Restatement cites no legal systems other than the United States that pur-
port to adhere to a reasonableness approach. Rather, it refers to the tensions caused by
conflicting claims to jurisdiction as a basis in international custom for such an approach.
Although other nations have objected to "unreasonable" American claims to jurisdic-
[Vol. 71:919928
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framework of this balance is designed to detect when the U.S. inter-
ests in the 'foreign' dispute are too weak-and the interests of re-
straint from extending our substantive law to judge that dispute too
strong-making assertion ofjurisdiction inappropriate. "68 The goal
of the reasonableness requirement is an increased sensitivity to the
regulatory interests of other states. 69 The requirement reflects a
growing awareness that zealous extraterritorial application of Amer-
ican regulation can damage American interests in several ways.
First, in the words of the drafters, "[c]onflict between regulations of
two states places the persons regulated in an intolerable situa-
tion."' 70 Different systems of securities regulation use different
methods to pursue different goals. 71 Consequently, an issuer, inves-
tor, or broker-dealer with international dealings may be caught be-
tween two conflicting regulatory systems. 72 The risk of dual
regulation may deter foreign parties from doing business with
Americans. 73
Second, claims to jurisdiction that other nations perceive as ex-
travagant may provoke retaliatory legislation. In 1980 the United
Kingdom adopted a statute empowering the Minister of Trade to
direct British subjects to disregard the laws or court orders of other
countries to the extent they purport to apply extraterritorially. This
statute was a direct response to aggressive application of the "ef-
fects" doctrine in American courts. 74 Similarly, a bill currently
pending before the Canadian Parliament would allow the Canadian
tion, they may not have recognized such a limit on their own jurisdiction. Thus, courts
should not consider the reasonableness requirement a matter of international law, but
one of statutory construction.
68 Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1464 (N.D. Cal.
1983), afl'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985).
69 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). See also Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.1 1 (1974) ("To determine that 'American stan-
dards of fairness' . . . must nonetheless govern the controversy demeans the standards
ofjustice elsewhere in the world, and unnecessarily exalts the primacy of United States
law over the laws of other countries.").
70 DRAF-r RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 403 comment d.
71 Willoughby, Remarks by an English Solicitor, PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITO-
RIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 58 (J. Griffin ed. 1979) ("Difficul-
ties arise when broad claims to jurisdiction coincide with material variations in
substantive law, and nowhere is this circumstance more apparent than in the fields of
antitrust law and securities regulation.").
72 Indeed, the laws of one state may demand conduct that violates those of another.
See SEC To Hold Hearing On German Fnd's Plan To Sell Shares to US. Investors, 15 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 19, 922 (May 13, 1983) [hereinafter cited as SEC To Hold Hearing].
73 Widmer, supra note 4, at 41.
74 When the statute was introduced in Parliament, the British Secretary of State for
Trade cited the application of "this pernicious extraterritorial 'effects' doctrine" to anti-
trust and securities cases. Blythe, The Extraterritorial Inpact of the Antitrust Laws: Protecting
British Trading Interests, 31 AM.J. Comp. L. 99, 109 (1983) (citing statement of Secretary
of State for Trade, Mr. John Nott).
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government to order reductions in "excessive" awards by foreign
courts and to order Canadian companies not to comply with foreign
regulations. 75 France, West Germany, Australia, The Netherlands,
and South Africa have also enacted defensive legislation. 76 Thus,
increased internationalization of markets has led to increased regu-
latory nationalism. 77 The consequences of such nationalism be-
come more troublesome as the international market grows. As a
result, regulators and courts must nationalize the allocation of
jurisdiction.
Under the Draft Restatement, concurrent claims to jurisdiction
may exist because section 403(2) does not require a court to deter-
mine whether American jurisdiction is the most reasonable. How-
ever, the reasonableness requirement minimizes such situations.
One court stated, "This examination. . . satisfies the prohibition of
international law against unreasonable assertions of prescriptive ju-
risdiction .. .[and] assures that concurrent jurisdiction will never
be lightly assumed."78
III
EVALUATING REASONABLENESS OF JURISDICTION UNDER
DRAFT RESTATEMENT SECTION 403
Section 403 of the Draft Restatement provides a list of factors that
affect the reasonableness ofjurisdiction. However, the Draft Restate-
ment provides little guidance to courts on how to apply the factors.
The Draft Restatement does not assign weight to the various factors,
nor does it explain what combinations of factors should make juris-
diction unreasonable. Ad hoc balancing of the numerous factors in
section 403 could result in increased uncertainty as to the extraterri-
torial scope of American regulation and more frequent application
of American law to transactions with substantial foreign elements.
One court commented that no court applying a similar jurisdictional
test in the antitrust context had declined jurisdiction when the
United States had more than a "de minimis" interest.79 Further-
more, the complexity of the section 403 analysis could deter courts
75 Canadian Government Sponsors Bill To Address Extratenitoriality Issue, [Jan.-June] ANTi-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1168, at 1106 (June 7, 1984).
76 DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, part IV, ch. 1 introductory note, at 91 & n.8.
See also Current Developments, The 1980 French Law on Documents and Infornation, 75 AM.
J. INT'L L. 382 (1981) (discussing French law raising barriers to discovery).
77 See Thomas, Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Laws: The Need For A
Balanced Policy, 7J. CORP. L. 189, 190 (1982) (antagonism and alienation of other nations
in response to aggressive assertions of American regulation may "impede the free flow
of capital" and lessen prospects for international cooperation).
78 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 952 n.169 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
79 Id. at 950-5 1.
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from adopting the Draft Restatement's approach or impede the man-
ageability of litigation.
The goals of the Draft Restatement may be enhanced at minimal
cost to judicial efficiency by assigning a more structured and limited
role to the section 403(2) reasonableness inquiry. Such an analysis
should devote primary consideration to the factors that comprise
the traditional jurisdictional analysis under the conduct and effects
tests. When these factors do not clearly favor asserting or declining
jurisdiction, courts should make two further inquiries: an assess-
ment of the degree of conflict between the relevant legal systems,8 0
and an evaluation of the interests of the "international system." 8'
Recognizing situations in which jurisdiction is presumptively unrea-
sonable would enhance further the utility and manageability of this
analysis.
A. Section 403 and Traditional Jurisdictional Analysis
In making jurisdictional determinations courts should rely first
on the conduct and effects tests largely as developed by the Second
Circuit.8 2 This analysis would generally provide a reliable indicator
of the extent of American interests in regulating a transaction.
When a transaction does not take place in, or affect, the American
marketplace, the United States should forbear expending regulatory
resources. The Second Circuit's conduct and effects analysis also
serves the Draft Restatement's goal of sensitivity to other nations' in-
terests because it recognizes that the extent of domestic conduct
and effects must be balanced with the conduct and effects that occur
abroad. Finally, the courts have had little difficulty examining these
concerns. According such a role to the conduct and effects tests
does not reject the section 403 reasonableness requirement.
Rather, it recognizes the primary significance of certain section 403
factors in the securities context.
1. Balancing Conduct and Effects
The Second Circuit's balancing of domestic and foreign con-
duct is reflected in two section 403 factors: "the extent to which the.
activity takes place within the regulating state,"8 3 and the "extent to
which another state may have an interest in regulating the activ-
80 See infra notes 102-28 and accompanying text. This assessment concerns factors
(c), (g), and (h) of § 403. See supra note 66.
81 See infra notes 131-71 and accompanying text. This evaluation concerns factors
(d), (e), and (0 of § 403. See supra note 66.
82 See supra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
83 DRtMT RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 403(2)(a)(i).
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ity." 8 4 The nation where most of a transaction occurs is likely to be
the most interested in regulating that conduct. The Draft Restate-
ment's version of the conduct test does not require that the transac-
tion be predominantly domestic, but if domestic conduct is less
significant than activities in another nation, jurisdiction is unlikely to
be reasonable.
Section 403 tradition may, however, expand the Second Cir-
cuit's version of the effects test. Under section 403(2)(a)(ii), "the
extent to which the activity. . . has substantial, direct and foresee-
able effect upon or in the regulating state" bears on the reasonable-
ness of jurisdiction.8 5 These effects include the generalized type
that the Second Circuit found inadequate by themselves to support
jurisdiction in Bersch.86 The court held that such effects alone would
not support jurisdiction under the traditional effects test, noting,
however, that they seriously implicated American regulatory inter-
ests.87 They should therefore be relevant to a jurisdictional inquiry
that focuses on such interests rather than on territoriality. Finally,
under section 403(2)(g), which requires consideration of the inter-
ests of other states in regulating the activity, courts should apply the
effects test relative to other nations' interests. If another nation is
the primary place of impact of the fraud, its regulatory interests are
stronger than those of the United States. Thus, the Draft Restate-
ment's treatment of the effects test goes further than the holdings of
the Second Circuit. However, if not supported by judicial authority,
it is based on the same policies that the courts have cited in applying
the traditional doctrines.
2. Links Between the Regulating State and the Parties
Under section 403(2)(b), ties of nationality, residence, and eco-
nomic activity between the regulating state and the defendants or
plaintiffs are relevant to the reasonableness ofjurisdiction. Courts
have considered these factors when applying the traditional conduct
and effects tests. Significant policies support consideration of the
defendant's links. However, the plaintiff's links are relevant only
because they can be a source of domestic effects. Consequently,
courts should not give independent weight to the plaintiff's links in
84 Id. § 4 03(2)(g).
85 Id. § 403(2)(a)(ii).
86 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987-88 (2d Cir.), cerd. denied sub
nor. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). In Bersch the fraud caused
foreign investors to lose confidence in American markets and in offshore funds and
damaged the American balance of payments, the prices of American securities in gen-
eral, and the ability of American corporations to raise capital abroad.
87 Id. at 989.
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the jurisdictional analysis but should only consider them under the
analysis of effects.
a. Links Between the Defendant and the Regulating State. Courts
should accord relevance to the defendant's links with the regulating
state for three reasons. First, if a defendant resides in or has sub-
stantial economic links to the United States, its securities fraud may
implicate a wide range of domestic regulatory interests, as in
Bersch.88 In addition, if the defendant is a citizen of the regulating
state, the "nationality" principle of international law strengthens
the argument for jurisdiction. Although this principle is disfavored
as an independent jurisdictional basis,8 9 when sufficient domestic
conduct or effect exists, the United States citizenship of the defend-
ant may make exercise ofjurisdiction more compelling. The Second
Circuit recognized in Cornfeld that the "American nationality of the
issuer. . . points strongly toward applying the anti-fraud provisions
of our securities laws." 90 Similarly, the Bersch and Fidenas courts
stated that the defendant's identification with another country
weighs against a finding of jurisdiction.9 1
Second, other nations may feel there is a greater infringement
on their sovereignty when American regulations are applied to their
resident citizens than when applied to Americans acting abroad.
American securities fraud provisions do not merely compensate
plaintiffs but also seek to encourage certain patterns of behavior.
Foreign states may object to the imposition of American goals on
their citizens.
Finally, the defendant's links can be the basis for justified ex-
pectations by the parties that American regulation will or will not
govern their transaction. 92 This concern merely supports the analy-
sis of section 403(2)(d), which suggests consideration of "the exist-
ence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation in question." 93
b. Links Between the Plaintiff and the Regulating State. The Draft
Restatement considers the plaintiff's ties to the regulating state rele-
vant to the jurisdiction inquiry. 94 However, the only independent
88 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89 See supra note 64.
90 IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrED STATES § 40 (1965) (nationality is factor in de-
ciding to exercise enforcement jurisdiction).
91 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987; Fidenas AG v. Honeywell Inc., 501 F. Supp. 1029, 1041
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
92 See Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 921 n. 13 (citing Note, American Adjudication of Transna-
tional Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 570 (1976)); Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992 (identifi-
cation of defendant with foreign nation militates against jurisdiction).
93 DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 403(2)(d).
94 Fidenas AG v. Honeywell Inc., 501 F. Supp. 1029, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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justification for a distinction between nonresident citizens and aliens
is the "passive personality" principle ofjurisdiction. 95 According to
this principle of international law, jurisdiction is justified solely on
the basis of the plaintiff's nationality.96 Courts and commentators
have criticized the principle because it "means that the citizen of
one country, when he visits another country, takes with him for his
'protection' the law of his own country and subjects those with
whom he comes into contact to the operation of that law, [violating
the] principle that a person visiting a foreign country falls under the
dominion of the local law." 97 In light of the disfavor of the passive
personality principle, 98 courts should consider the plaintiff's citizen-
ship relevant to the reasonableness ofjurisdiction only to the extent
that it relates to a finding of domestic effects. 99 As the Eighth Cir-
cuit recognized in Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oil-
seeds, 100 other links between the plaintiff and the regulating state,
such as residence and economic activity, are also relevant to a find-
ing of domestic effects. 10 However, they also should not be consid-
ered for other purposes.
An evaluation of the reasonableness ofjurisdiction should thus
95 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have questioned the constitutionality of a distinc-
tion between such plaintiffs. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 426 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1983); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, 592 F.2d 409, 418
n.14 (8th Cir. 1979). The basis of the constitutional question is that alienage is a semi-
suspect classification, the use of which is barred by the equal protection clause in the
absence of a substantial state interest. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 686 (2d ed. 1983); Note, supra note 92, at 569
n.95. However, it is doubtful that equal protection concerns constrain jurisdictional
analysis in this manner. The equal protection clause bars any state from denying "to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that for
equal protection purposes, jurisdiction encompasses control over all persons within the
territory of the United States. Thus, a nonresident alien is probably not entitled to
equal protection guarantees. Even if the equal protection clause applies, the govern-
ment has a sufficient interest in distinguishing between nonresidents based on citizen-
ship to satisfy the constitutional standard. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra
at 687-88 (merely rational basis required for federal distinctions based on alienage that
bear some relationship to foreign relations).
96 See DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402 comment e.
97 Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10, at 92 (Judg-
ment of Sept. 7).
98 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1984); DRAFr RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402 comment e; see also id. § 402 comment b.
99 Thus, "protection of a United States national residing abroad may not, without
some additional factor, warrant exercise of regulatory jurisdiction by the United States"
because too much reliance on this factor would be an application of the passive person-
ality principle. DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 416 reporters' note 3.
100 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
101 Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 420 ("the absence of a domestic plaintiff, domestic
securities, or the use of a national securities exchange, in short the absence of a domes-
tic impact or effect").
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begin with application of the Second Circuit's pre-Draft Restatement
analysis. Under this approach, courts should recognize that a find-
ing of "substantial" American conduct or effects requires considera-
tion of both foreign and domestic implications and of the
defendant's citizenship. If the transaction's "center of gravity" is
clearly domestic, courts should presume that no state's interest in
regulating the transaction is as compelling as that of the United
States.
B. Balancing National Interests
If two or more states have a substantial nexus to a transaction,
the Draft Restatement recommends that courts make jurisdictional de-
terminations "by evaluating the respective interests of the regulat-
ing states in light of the criteria set forth in § 403(2)."102 This
jurisdictional evaluation assesses the strength of each state's inter-
ests by examining the extent of the conflicting regulatory systems,
their similarities to the systems of other nations, and their relation-
ship to the needs of the international system.103
Other nations' securities laws may differ from United States se-
curities regulation in several respects. For example, actions under
rule 10b-5 are closely associated with the class action and derivative
suit, procedural devices not necessarily accepted abroad.10 4 Many
nations consider class actions, contingency fees, and liberal discov-
ery rules representative of an American pro-plaintiff bias.10 5 Fur-
thermore, many nations do not share the substantive principles of
American securities law antifraud rules. Some, for instance, do not
recognize a cause of action for an omission to state a material
fact. 106 Foreign plaintiffs may have to prove affirmatively that their
102 DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 403 comment d.
103 Id.
104 In Canada, only the province of Quebec permits class actions. Taylor & Head,
Representing Collective Interests: A Comparative Synopsis, 58J. URB. L. 587, 595 (1981). The
Canadian federal courts and the courts of the other provinces recognize only "represen-
tative actions." Id. at 592. A "representative action," while providing a mechanism for
group litigation, "may not be brought for recovery of money damages." Id. British law
is similarly limited. Civil code countries generally reject the concept of private rights of
action, relying instead on public officials to represent collective interests. Id. at 599-603.
Derivative suits are more widely permitted but still are not recognized in some nations.
See, e.g., 10A INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 8-41 (H.
Bloomenthal ed. 1985) (no derivative suits in Netherlands) [hereinafter cited as INTER-
NATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS].
105 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981). See also British Air-
ways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413, 419 (H.L.) ("civil procedure in the
federal courts of the United States. . .seems to any English lawyer strange and, indeed,
oppressive upon defendants").
106 In the United Kingdom, omissions are apparently only actionable when a pro-
spectus omits a statutory requirement under § 38(4) of the 1948 Companies Act. See
10A INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 104, at 6-44. Swiss law has a similar
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losses were caused by the defendant's misrepresentation,10 7
whereas under American securities law courts may presume causa-
tion.10 8 Finally, in the United States the statute of limitations appli-
cable to securities fraud is much more lenient than that in many
other nations. 0 9
The substantive differences between legal systems are particu-
larly apparent in the regulation of insider trading. In the United
States, rule lOb-5 and sections 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are used to regulate trading on inside information.' 10 In
Europe legislation regarding the improper use of inside information
exists only in the United Kingdom and France."' The French stat-
ute barring insider trading is rarely enforced, 112 largely because
"such activities were a tradition on the part of the most respectable
directors and officers, and. . . tipping was even a social duty, being
expected of relatives and friends." '"13 Similarly, one commentator
has referred to insider trading as "virtually legal" in the United
provision. See International Securities Project, 30 Bus. LAW. 585, 641 (1975). In Germany
omissions only give rise to a cause of action if the omission takes place in a "listing"
prospectus or in the sale of shares by an investment company. Otherwise, a deceptive or
misleading representation is required. Id. at 664-65. Cf. 5A A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF
RULE 10B-5 § 61 (revised ed. 1980) (American standards of what constitutes material
omission).
107 France, for instance, requires the plaintiff to show that his damages are "actual
and certain, personal to the plaintiff, and a direct consequence of the crime." 10A IN-
TERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 104, at 7-33. Swiss law also requires that the
plaintiff prove causation. International Securities Project, supra note 106, at 641.
108 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 106, § 64.
109 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5, at 10-8 (2d ed.
1985) (statute of limitations for rule 1Ob-5 is that which local state applies to common
law fraud actions). Netherlands law provides a six month statute of limitations for an
action for omissions or misstatements in a prospectus. International Securities Project, supra
note 106, at 629. German law applies the same statutory period to actions against in-
vestment companies. Id. at 665.
110 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (discussing application of rule lOb-5
to insider trading activities).
11 Cruickshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 345, 346 (1982). See
also Briner, Insider Trading in Switzerland, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 348 (1982) (Switzerland has
no legislation on insider trading). See generally MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES-CORPO-
RATE INSIDERS (L. Loss ed. 1975).
112 In the four years following adoption of the statute, the French administrative
body responsible for regulation of securities trading, the Commission du Bourse (COB),
undertook 105 inquiries into possible insider trading. Of these, the COB referred only
seven cases to the public prosecutor for enforcement. MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES-
CORPORATE INSIDERS, supra note 111, at 50. In 1979 the COB transmitted four cases to
the public prosecutor and the criminal court of Paris returned convictions in two cases.
Macqueron, Developments in French Law on Disclosure and Trading of Securities, 5 J. CoMP.
Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 71, 74 (1983). As a result, it is unlikely that in an actual instance
of insider trading, an aggrieved shareholder would have a criminal conviction on which
he could predicate a civil action, which provides victims of crimes with a right to dam-
ages, 10A INTERNATINAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 104, at 7-32.
113 Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law and Securities Regulation,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 762 (1982).
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Kingdom." 14 In Germany insider trading is regulated by a nongov-
ernmental Board of Inquiry organized by industrial and trade as-
sociations."15  Sanctions are imposed only by the affected
corporation, on recommendations by the Board. 116 Rule lOb-5 has
also been used as a general prohibition on wrongful corporate con-
duct. While other nations may closely regulate the actions of of-
ficers and directors, their statutes generally do not confer rights on
shareholders to enforce such duties."17
The differences in securities regulation among nations are not
accidental but reflect differing regulatory philosophies. The United
Kingdom, France, and Belgium, for instance, rely on direct regula-
tion of internal corporate dealings to protect investors," 8 rather
than on affirmative disclosure and creation of private rights. Conse-
quently, these states are less likely to define nondisclosure as fraud
and may prefer criminal sanctions to private rights."l 9
The less rigorous disclosure requirements of other nations may
reflect different market conditions. For instance, France has
avoided increased disclosure requirements for fear of discouraging
enterprises from entering capital markets.' 20 Many foreign busi-
nessmen fear that disclosure of trade information will aid their com-
petitors. 121 Furthermore, one commentator noted that "[floreign
114 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 104, at 1-90. See also MULTINA-
TIONAL APPROACHES-CORPORATE INSIDERS, supra note 111, at 236.
115 MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES-CORPORATE INSIDERS, supra note 111, at 60.
116 Id. at 62.
117 In France, article 244 of the 1966 Act on Commercial Companies makes the ad-
ministrator of a company liable for losses due to his negligence in management, or viola-
tion of statutes or regulations. However, for various reasons, this provision has not to
date been used to enforce securities laws. 10A INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra
note 104, at 7-32. In England, "[t]here are general. . . duties imposed on directors,
which can include securities fraud", e.g. issuing shares for an improper purpose. Share-
holders' rights, though, are solely derivative. Id. at 6-50. In addition, suits to enforce
these rights are rare, occurring if at all on the insolvency of the company. Knauss, Securi-
ties Regulation-A Comparison of Practice and Purpose, 62 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 131, 138
(1968). In Belgium, "[sihareholder action against directors . . . for improper activity
. . . is practically nonexistant." Id.
118 See Knauss, supra note 117, at 131; Knauss, Securities Regulation in the United King-
dom: A Comparison with United States Practice, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 49, 53-60, 97
(1971) (British securities regulation is more concerned with "men behind the companies
and the 'integrity of management'" than with full disclosure).
119 See 10A INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 104, at 7-29 ("The charac-
teristic feature of [French] securities laws . . . is the basic policy decision to favor the
use of criminal sanctions.").
120 Note, Disclosure Requirements in France: Problems in the Development of Effective Securities
Regulation, 12 VA.J. INT'L L. 358, 363 (1972).
121 H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1048 (1976). While a
similar fear was voiced in the United States prior to the passage of the Securities Act,
"an American firm knows that its competitors are bound to equal disclosure require-
ments. . . . A corporation in, say, Germany may be reluctant to reveal information that
its competitors in Italy can conceal." Id. at 1048-49.
9371986]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
business firms inherit a longer and more pervasive tradition of 'se-
crecy'-a tradition hostile to the notion that a privately-owned com-
pany's affairs are properly the public's concern."' 22  Finally,
European investors rely more heavily on informal communications
and are generally considered more informed and able to make in-
vestment judgments than the American investment community. 123
As a result, issuer disclosure receives less emphasis, and the investor
has primary responsibility to gain access to investment information.
Different nations have adopted different regulatory mecha-
nisms, reflecting varying goals, strategies, and market conditions.
Courts cannot presume that because all nations oppose fraud the
likelihood of regulatory conflict is minimal. 124 Such an approach
conflicts with the Draft Restatement's goal of increased sensitivity to
conflicting national policies. Instead, the Draft Restatement requires
an evaluation of the conflicting national interests and policies in-
volved in the jurisdictional determination.
Where conflicts exist, courts should consider jurisdiction less
reasonable because the other nation is more likely to object to im-
position of American regulations and regulatory goals. The courts
should not need to engage in such an analysis, however, if American
interests are dearly compelling under the conduct and effects tests.
In such a case, American jurisdiction will be reasonable even if poli-
cies directly conflict. Even if the traditional analysis does not pro-
duce a clear result, evaluation of interests should not become a
normative inquiry into other nations' regulatory systems or an as-
sessment of the significance those states accord to specific legisla-
122 Id. at 1048.
123 Id. While we may see this lack of public participation in the market as a problem
to be cured through regulation, such a choice as to the desired nature of securities mar-
kets is precisely the sort that should be made by the government most affected. See also
Widmer, supra note 4, at 40. In the Federal Republic of Germany investments usually
are made only after considerable investigation. Furthermore, the stock market has lim-
ited volatility and speculative forms of investment are scarce. Thus, Germany has less
need for American-type disclosure requirements. Krauss, Securities Regulation in Germany?
Investors' Remedies for Misleading Statements by Issuers, 18 INT'L LAw. 109, 124-25 (1984).
124 SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.) (enforcement of antifraud provisions
extraterritorially will cause favorable reciprocal responses by other nations), cert. denied
sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. Ltd. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); see also Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp.
582, 587 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (rejecting need for evaluation of interests of other nations
on ground that "every civilized nation doubtless has this [rule against fraud] as part of
its legal system"), rev'd on other grounds, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1982); Comment, The
Transnational Reach of Rule lOb-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363, 1399 (1973).
Indeed, the laws of one state may directly contradict the laws of another. For in-
stance, German law shields individuals associated with a mutual fund from some liabili-
ties that American law would affirmatively impose. See SEC To Hold Hearings, supra note
72, at 922.
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tion. Analysis at these levels would require courts to perform an
essentially political function.1 25 Instead, courts merely should as-
certain the extent of conflict between the laws and policies of differ-
ent nations.
Because the policy goals of securities laws cannot be reduced to
simple propositions, courts should guard against overlooking im-
portant foreign regulatory interests. As one commentator noted, in
balancing interests, "the courts [improperly] focus on the national
interests reflected [only] in the local laws in conflict, ignoring inter-
nal systemic interests."1 26 Indeed, even the absence of regulation
by another state may reflect "definite policies concerning the char-
acter of its commercial climate," according to the Ninth Circuit.1 27
Courts should presume that the more the relevant national in-
terests and policies conflict, the more another state will perceive
American regulation as an affront to its power to determine its own
regulatory goals. 128 A finding that a high level of conflict exists
should require a greater showing that other factors favor American
regulation. On the other hand, if there is little conflict, courts
should be more willing to apply American law.
C. The Needs of the International System
A second level of analysis that courts should undertake when
traditional analyses do not indicate a clearly compelling American
or foreign interest is an assessment of the traditions and goals of the
125 See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court
is not "qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly balancing" such
"purely political factors"); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (court has "little expertise. . . to evaluate the economic and social poli-
cies of a foreign country").
126 Maier, Interest Balancing and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 31 AM.J. COMP. L. 579, 591
(1983). For instance, in one case in which the SEC sought information from a Swiss
bank, the district court concluded that the relevant foreign interest was maintaining a
secret bank account, rather than guaranteeing "confidentiality in order to encourage
beneficial local economic activity." Id. at 592; SEC v. Banca delia Svizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Other courts, however, have been more sensitive to the
policies of other nations. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 749 F.2d
1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985). Courts also should not inter-
pret one state's choice not to regulate a specific area as an indication that no conflict
exists between its policies and those of the United States.
127 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 749 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984)
(antitrust), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 3514 (1985).
128 This presumption should not be subject to rebuttal through drawn-out litigation
but only through a declaration by the other nation that American law would further its
interests as well. The Ninth Circuit used this approach in a recent tax case in which the
American corporate taxpayer was charged with using a Swiss subsidiary for tax avoid-
ance purposes. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981). In uphold-
ing the enforcement of a summons to produce documents, the Ninth Circuit cited an
affidavit from the Swiss government disclaiming a strong Swiss interest in the outcome
of the case. Id. at 1331.
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international business community. One commentator has noted the
"lack of agreed upon [substantive] values and purposes in the inter-
national community"' 129 and so concluded that the only goals that
courts should take into account in determining jurisdiction are the
"process goals" of predictability and uniformity of result.'3 0 How-
ever, in the context of international markets, many regulatory sys-
tems give greater deference to party autonomy and to the
expectations of the parties than in the domestic context. This sub-
stantive value furthers the process goals of predictability and uni-
formity of result. Under this analysis, if a securities transaction
spans several nations and does not have its "center of gravity" in
one market, a court should determine whether the parties expected
the protection of American securities laws.
1. Explicit Indications of the Parties' Expectations
Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides
that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule
or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required
thereby shall be void."' 31 This section generally bars any provision
in securities transactions for arbitration of disputes. 132 However, in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 133 the Supreme Court held that section
29(a) does not bar arbitration clauses in international transactions.
The Court balanced the section 29(a) goal of investor protection
against the interests of the United States in encouraging "the will-
ingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international com-
mercial agreements"' 134 and found that in an international
transaction, international goals outweighed the policies of the statu-
tory anti-waiver provision. 135 In so finding, the Court noted that
recognition of the parties' expectations, as embodied in the arbitra-
tion clause, would further international commerce by enhancing
129 Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and
Private International Law, 76 AM.J. INT'L L. 280, 316 (1982).
130 Id. at 320.
131 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982).
132 Ayers v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
133 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
134 Id. at 517.
135 The Scherk Court relied on The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1970). The Bremen Court upheld a forum-selection clause in an international towage
contract. According to the Court, "in an era of expanding world trade and commerce,
the absolute aspects of the doctrine [denying effect to such clauses] would be a heavy
hand indeed on the future development of international commercial dealings by Ameri-
cans. We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets . . . on our terms, gov-
erned by our laws." Id. at 9.
[Vol. 71:919940
TRANSNA TIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD
"orderliness and predictability."'' 36
In AVC Nederland v. Atrium Investment Partnership '3 7 the Second
Circuit extended the scope of the international exception to section
29(a) by holding that choice of law and choice of forum clauses are
permissible in international securities transactions as well as arbitra-
tion clauses.1 38 The court noted that international transactions im-
plicate " 'considerations and policies significantly different from
those found controlling in [domestic settings].' "139 The considera-
ble uncertainty as to which law will govern and the potential for for-
eign orders enjoining United States proceedings contribute to the
uniqueness of international transactions. 140 The Nederland court re-
duced the uncertainties of international transactions by allowing the
parties to fix their expectations through a choice of law and forum
clause.
The Scherk court noted, and the Nederland court recognized, that
"situations may arise where the contacts with foreign countries are
so insignificant or attenuated" that clauses stipulating the applicable
law and forum will not be valid. 41 Neither case established clear
standards for determining when foreign contacts are so insignificant
that a stipulation should be ignored. However, each court based its
holding on the "considerable uncertainty [that] existed at the time
of the agreement. . . concerning the law applicable to the resolu-
tion of disputes arising out of the contract" in the absence of a
choice of law and forum provision. 142 When the conduct and effects
tests clearly resolve the jurisdictional inquiry, no uncertainty exists,
and courts should not give effect to a selection of a foreign forum
and law. The concern for uncertainty is not relevant in cases with
few foreign contacts because the parties should expect that, absent a
stipulation clause, only an American court can settle any contro-
versy arising out of the transaction, under American law. The only
justification for a choice of law and forum clause in such a case
would be to avoid American law, rather than to clarify the applicable
law. 143
Courts should not apply an objective test in evaluating the com-
136 417 U.S. at 516.
137 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
138 Id. at 155-59.
'39 Id. at 157 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515).
140 Id. at 157-58 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516).
141 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517 n. 11; Nederland, 740 F.2d at 158-59.
142 Nederland, 740 F.2d at 157-58 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516); see Scherk, 417 U.S.
at 515-16 (describing various difficulties and conflicts caused by uncertainty as to which
law will govern transaction).
143 An additional limitation on the ability of parties to "contract out" of American
securities law would of course be the unenforceability of a choice of law clause if the
inclusion of "that clause was itself the product of fraud or coercion," .ederland, 740 F.2d
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plex issue of whether an American court, absent the choice of law
and forum clause, can clearly exercise jurisdiction. Rather, they
should assess the likelihood that a party to the transaction realisti-
cally could have expected that an American court would adjudicate a
conflict arising from the transaction.
2. Implicit Expectations of the Parties
American conflict of laws principles dictate that courts should
give effect to a clear implication of the parties' intent if the parties
do not stipulate governing law.' 44 Other nations adhere to the same
principles. 145 Since Scherk and Nederland drew on conflicts of law
principles in recognizing the validity of a choice of law and forum
clause, this principle as well should be made part of the jurisdic-
tional analysis. Courts may infer intent in several situations. First,
courts may draw inferences from the defendant's apparent associa-
tion with one country. In Bersch the Second Circuit stated that if the
public strongly associated a defendant with one country, a court of
another nation would have more difficulty claiming jurisdiction. 146
Declarations by defendants also could lead investors to believe
that a security was essentially American and thus to expect the pro-
tection of American law. In Finch v. Marathon Securities 147 the de-
fendant's prospectus stated that the offering was subject to United
States securities regulations "to the extent that the subject matter of
the agreement is within [their] purview."1 48 Such statements could
at 158 n.16 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 n.14). Similarly, such a clause may not apply
to a claim that the entire transaction was induced by fraud. See id. at 155.
144 A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 470 (1962); 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971); H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 204 (1964).
According to one commentator, "[m]uch of [conflicts] doctrine revolves around the
catch-all of 'intent'-if the relevant intent is not reasonably clear from admissible evi-
dence, it is derived from rules that are the result of a mixture of past experience, custom
and policy." Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in
Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE LJ. 1087, 1124 (1956). See also Simson, State
Autonomy In Choice Of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 61, 64-65 (1978)
("[The Supreme] Court has appeared to concede that a choice of law that grossly upsets
a party's justified expectations violates the due process clause .... ").
145 The 1980 European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions gives effect not only to an express choice of law clause, but also to a reasonably
certain expression of intent manifest in the circumstances of the case. Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 29, 1980, European Economic
Community, art. III, para. 1, reprinted in III G. DELAUME, TRANSNATiONAL CONTRACTS
appendix I, booklet A, at 52. See also Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation v. Compa-
gnie d'Argement Maritime [1971] 1 A.C. 572; Whitwoth St. Estates (Manchester) v.
James Miller & Partners [1970] 1 A.C. 583.
146 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 986-87 (noting Rolls-Royce and its association with Britain as
an example).
147 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
148 Id. at 1348. Similarly, in Wandschneider v. Industrial Incomes, Inc., [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,422 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the defendant's
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lead a court to conclude that the defendant sought to create an im-
pression that American law would protect prospective investors.
Consequently, courts should protect the imputed intent of the pur-
chasers, while estopping the defendant from denying that he ex-
pected American law to govern the transaction. 149  When
defendants seek to cloak their activities in an American aura, courts
should consider that the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction is
enhanced.
Finally, the decision to structure a deal to avoid conduct within
the United States may be based as on much on legal considerations
as on a choice of law or forum clause. 150 If a transaction has been so
structured, a court should show some deference to the parties' ex-
pectations, as manifested in their conduct. Thus, in Plessey Co. v.
General Electric Co., the district court found that the imposition of
American tender offer regulations on a British corporation would
"frustrate [its] legitimate expectations," because the company had
deliberately structured its tender offer for another British company
to avoid involving American shareholders. 151
Considering the implicit expectations of the parties will enable
courts to avoid one artificiality of the traditional conduct and effects
prospectus mentioned American banks and emphasized that the issuing company was
"regulated" by, and had filed with, the SEC and was a member of the American National
Association of Securities Dealers. Only at the end of the prospectus did it mention that
the instant transaction was not subject to such regulations. Id. One commentator has
noted that "[i]n such a situation, the United States dearly has an interest in adjudicating
claims against the defendants ... in order to discourage other potential perpetrators of
fraud from taking advantage of American resources and prestige ... [and thus] protect-
ing the integrity of American securities markets." Note, supra note 92, at 570-71.
149 See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909,921 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendants "with whom we
are here concerned acted within the United States and cannot fairly object to having
their conduct judged by its laws").
The estoppel analysis applies to suits against broker-dealers as well as suits against
issuers. In Mormels v. Girofinance S.A., 544 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court
declined to apply rule lOb-5 to transactions involving a Costa Rican firm that had
claimed to be an agent of E.F. Hutton, because the transactions took place entirely
abroad and had no domestic effects. If the plaintiffs could have shown some domestic
conduct or effects, jurisdiction would have been reasonable under the approach sug-
gested by this Note because it would satisfy the goal of protecting justified expectations.
The Costa Rican defendant sought to convey the impression that it was acting as an
American broker and affirmatively created expectations on the part of its clients.
Courts should more readily uphold the plaintiffs justified expectations if he is less
sophisticated than the defendant. The unsophisticated investor "justifiably places reli-
ance on the good faith of the company .... His reasonable expectations in the trans-
action may not justly be frustrated and courts have properly molded their interpretive
principles with that uppermost in mind." Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J.
294, 305, 208 A.2d 638, 644 (1965).
150 Note, Extraterrito ial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28
STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1033 n.190 (1976).
151 Plessey Co. v. General Elec. Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,486 (D. Del. Jan.
16, 1986).
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tests. The courts' reliance solely on the tests could encourage
American corporations seeking to tap foreign capital markets to
avoid activity in American territory and thus avoid the impact of rule
lOb-5. Because the securities of American corporations will be "es-
sentially American,"' 52 investors may expect American law to gov-
ern the offering unless the issuer clearly disclaims the applicability
of American law. If investor expectations favor applying American
law, courts should find jurisdiction even if the conduct within Amer-
ican borders is "secondary." Conversely, if an American purchases
foreign securities abroad, courts can infer that the investor did not
expect the protection of American law. 153
3. Implicit Expectations and the "Internal Affairs Rule"
Rule 1Ob-5 provides the basis for direct or derivative actions
alleging breach of fiduciary duty.154 When rule lOb-5 actions in-
volve foreign corporations, courts generally uphold the expecta-
tions of the parties if they decline to find subject matter
jurisdiction. 155 This approach is consistent with the "internal affairs
rule" of conflict of laws, which requires courts to apply the law of
the state of incorporation in suits involving internal corporate af-
fairs.' 5 6 In First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio, 157 an
152 Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 920.
153 Id. at 1030-33.
154 See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217 (2d Cir. 1977) (10b-5 protects
against "deception of the corporation ...when the corporation is influenced by its
controlling shareholder to engage in a transaction adverse to the corporation's inter-
ests"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). One particularly common type of breach of
fiduciary duty under rule lOb-5 is insider trading. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
155 American courts should, of course, assert jurisdiction when a foreign issuer is
American in practical effect, such as an American corporation's wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary. See Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 920.
156 R. LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAws 187 (1959).
The internal affairs of brokers, dealers, and banks are exempt from regulation
under § 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act if they "transac[t] a business in securities
without the jurisdiction of the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1982). See generally
Hacker & Rotunda, The Extraterritorial Regulation of Foreign Businesses Under the U.S. Securi-
ties Laws, 59 N.C.L. REV. 643, 656-60 (1981). This exception applies only to regulations
that govern ongoing business affairs. Id. at 644. Thus, Hacker and Rotunda argue, it is
not applicable to rule lOb-5. Id. They claim further that it indicates congressional in-
tent not to regulate the internal operations of foreign corporations. Id. at 657.
The special claim of the state of incorporation to regulate the relationship between
a corporation and its shareholders is recognized under international law. The Interna-
tional Court ofJustice, in Barcelone Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 5), held that Belgium lacked the capacity to assert a claim for
compensation of its nationals, who were shareholders in a Canadian corporation, against
Spain for violations of international law. Rather, "the general rule of international law
authorizes the national state of the company alone to make a claim." Id. at 46. The
court noted that by allowing more than one nation discretion to exercise this right, "an
atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in international economic relations" would re-
sult. Id. at 49.
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action against a Cuban bank, the Supreme Court stated that "the
law of the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating
to the internal affairs of a corporation"1 5 8 and "[a]pplication of that
body of law achieves the need for certainty and predictability of re-
sult while generally protecting the justified expectations of parties
with interests in the corporation."' 159
The district court in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 160 a derivative suit
brought by the American shareholders of a Canadian corporation,
also adhered to the internal affairs principle in refusing to find sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The court stated that when a complaint "es-
sentially alleges a breach of the directors' fiduciary duty," the
liabilities in question should be determined under the laws of the
state of incorporation unless the company is foreign in name
only. 161 According to the court, this principle protects "the reason-
able expectations of the parties" because the conduct of directors
that is permissible under the laws of the state of incorporation
should not be attacked under the law of a foreign state and because
shareholders "can reasonably be presumed to have agreed that
[their] relationship with the corporation is governed by the laws of
the state of incorporation."' 162
The Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green 163 also supports the use of the internal affairs rule as a limit on
the extraterritorial scope of the federal securities laws. The Santa Fe
Court sharply limited the availability of rule 10b-5 to plaintiffs alleg-
ing violations of fiduciary duties, noting that actions to enforce the
fiduciary duties of directors are more properly the province of state
law.164 Thus, the Court was "reluctant to federalize the substantial
portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in
securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate
regulation would be overriden."'165 The Court reasoned that
157 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
158 Id. at 621.
159 Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 comment e (1971)
("[a]pplication of the local law of the state of incorporation will usually be supported by
those choice-of-law factors favoring the needs of the interstate and international sys-
tems, certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, [and] protection of the justified
expectations of the parties").
160 268 F. Supp. 385, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nor. Manley v.
Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
161 Id. at 392. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (asserting jurisdiction
as to purchase of debentures of wholly owned subsidiary of American corporation).
162 268 F. Supp. at 392.
163 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See generally M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
196-97 (1983) (erudite discussion of Sante Fe).
164 430 U.S. at 477-80.
165 Id. at 479.
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" '[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit
their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that . ..
state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.' "166
This reasoning is even more applicable to foreign corporations. In-
vestors in foreign corporations are likely to be more aware of the
nationality of the corporation than investors in American corpora-
tions are aware of the state of incorporation. Consequently, inves-
tors in foreign corporations are unlikely to assume that United
States law governs the internal affairs of the corporation. Moreover,
there is no apparent reason why transactions governed by foreign
law should be more subject to federal securities regulation than
transactions governed by state law. 167
Rule lOb-5 often provides a cause of action for suits seeking
damages for one particular type of breach of fiduciary duty, trading
on the basis of material nonpublic information. Application of the
internal affairs rule to preclude United States jurisdiction over trad-
ing by insiders of foreign corporations does not conflict with any of
the policies underlying the application of rule lOb-5 to such con-
duct. For instance, commentators have asserted that it is inherently
unfair to allow insiders an advantage over public investors. 168 The
internal affairs rule is consistent with this rationale. If American in-
vestors are less confident in the fairness of investment in foreign
corporations, they will avoid investing in foreign firms; if foreign
markets suffer as a result, foreign regulators may provide correc-
tion. Commentators also claim that banning insider trading in-
creases market efficiency by facilitating the flow of information to
the public. 16 9 Again, nonapplication of American insider trading
standards to foreign corporations will only affect the efficiency of
those foreign markets that are more properly regulated by others,
while application of the standards to American corporations will in-
crease their attractiveness to foreign investors.
166 Id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)) (emphasis added by Court).
167 Under Santa Fe, some claims for breaches of fiduciary duties remain valid under
rule lOb-5 because of the need for a uniform federal law to govern entities which have
,.national investor constituencies and national economic significance." M. STEINBERG,
supra note 163, at 197.
While in some cases, see Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 (2d Cir. 1977), the
need for a federal regulatory scheme justifies "federalizing" the law governing the inter-
nal affairs of American corporations, it is arrogant to claim that the need for minimum
international standards justifies " 'Americaniz[ing]' the corporation laws of the entire
world." 1IT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing rationale of Santa
Fe to support refusal to find subject-matter jurisdiction), revd, 619 F.2d 609 (2d Cir.
1979).
168 Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Laige Coipora-
tion, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1982). See also Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclo-
sure, and Corporate Privay, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 805-09 (1980).
169 Haft, supra note 168, at 1051-52. See also Scott, supra note 168, at 809-14.
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Finally, the "business property" rationale claims that inside in-
formation is corporate property "intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose," 170 and that prohibition of insider trading may
enhance the efficiency of corporate decisionmaking. 171 These
rationales focus exclusively on the injury to the corporation and not
the trading public. Such "corporate governance" concerns are
squarely within the purview of the internal affairs rule.
The principles of uniformity and protection ofjustified expecta-
tions which underlie the internal affairs rule are the same principles
that American courts recognize as particularly appropriate in the
context of international business transactions. The internal affairs
rule is also consistent with the rationales underlying the prohibition
of insider trading. Thus, this rule, as well as that recognizing choice
of law clauses, should be ajurisdictional "per se rule" that is deter-
minative ofjurisdiction when the center of gravity of the transaction
at issue is not clearly in any one nation. This approach enhances the
predictability of results and respects the expectations of the parties.
CONCLUSION
If courts retain expansive jurisdictional rules based on territori-
ality rather than regulatory interest, the internationalization of the
world securities markets will cause increasing conflicts between reg-
ulatory systems and enhance the uncertainties of engaging in inter-
national commerce. The Draft Restatement thus properly recognizes
that jurisdiction is more reasonable when it accounts for the inter-
ests of other nations and the interests of the participants in the in-
ternational business community. The Draft Restatement's approach,
however, should not be interpreted to replace traditional jurisdic-
tional rules based on territoriality with little more than an unstruc-
tured normative assessment. A better approach would be for courts
to utilize the factors enumerated in section 403 to formulate new
rules and presumptions.
Ajudicially manageable approach to reasonableness should be-
gin with a determination of whether the United States is clearly the
nation most implicated by the transaction, either because most of
the relevant conduct occurred there or because most of the effects
were felt there. If it is, jurisdiction should be presumptively reason-
able. If the United States is not so clearly implicated, courts should
determine whether a conflict in relevant regulatory policies or the
expectations of the parties justify accepting or rejecting American
170 Haft, supra note 168, at 1052; Scott, supra note 168, at 814-15.
171 The presence of widespread insider trading would cause delay and distortion in
transmission of information, and loss ofinternal cohesion, trust, and morale. Haft, supra
note 168, at 1053-57, 1060-63.
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jurisdiction. Finally, courts should not apply American law when
the parties have explicitly selected the law of another country to
govern their transaction, or when the claim relates to the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation. This approach is consistent with the
aims of the Draft Restatement, enhances judicial manageability and
predictability, and precludes substitution of unstructured discretion
for reasoned analysis.
David Michaels
